



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

1987-06

A pragmatic assizement of defense contractor risk

Louk, David Joseph

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/22426

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun



Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.

> Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School 411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle Monterey, California USA 93943

http://www.nps.edu/library



NATAL SUPPRACTATE SCHOOL

KITCH DE CASS 5002





NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

A PRAGMATIC ASSIZEMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTOR RISK, PROFITABILITY, AND DEBT: 1976-1984

bу

David Joseph Louk

June 1987

Thesis Advisor:

Dan C. Boger

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.



URITY (CLASS	FICATION	OF THE	PAGE

CURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE						
REI	PORT DOCU	MENTATION	PAGE			
REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	16 RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS					
Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT					
3 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			for public		۵.	
DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			tion is unl		.	
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		S MONITORING	ORGANIZATION RE	PORT NUN	ABER(S)	
	OFFICE SYMBOL	7a NAME OF M	78 NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION			
	If applicable) 54	Naval Po	stgraduate S	School		
: ADDRESS (City, State, and 2IP Code)	J4		ry. State, and ZIP (
			,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	,		
Monterey, California 93943-5000		Monterey	, California	a 93943	-5000	
	FFICE SYMBOL	9 PROCUREMEN	T INSTRUMENT IDE	NTIFICATIO	N NUMBER	
ORGANIZATION (II	f applicable)					
ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10 SOURCE OF	UNDING NUMBER	S		
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO	PROJECT NO	TASK	WORK UNIT	
		Eccivient No			Accession No	
TITLE (Include Security Classification)		1				
A PRAGMATIC ASSIZEMENT OF DEFEN	SE CONTRACT	OR RISK, PRO	FITABILITY,	AND DE	BT:	
1976-1984 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)						
Louk, David Joseph						
Master's Thesis 13b TIME COVERED FROM	TYPE OF REPORT 136 TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 15 PAGE COUNT					
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION		1987, Jun	<u> </u>		58	
COSATI CODES 18	UBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse	e if necessary and	identify by	block number)	
F ELD GROUP SUB-GROUP				, , ,		
	Defense Cor	ntractor Ris	K			
ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and id	entify by block of	number)				
This thesis is an invest	0			•	T I	
relationship between defense co commercially oriented firms' ri						
attempted to quantify the inter						
Hurdle's leverage, risk, market	structure	, and profit	ability mode	el is u	sed as a	
basis for the current model of	-		-	-		
defense contractor risk and profit relationships are performed using least squares regression analysis, Chow tests, and three stage simultaneous regression						
analysis.						
O STRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT		21 ARSTRACT SE	CURITY CLASSIFICA	TION		
DUNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED - SAME AS RPT	DTIC USERS	Unclassi				
NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Professor Dan C. Boger		226 TELEPHONE (1 408-646-2	Include Area Code) 607		CE SYMBOL Bo	
rioressor bair o. boger		1 -00 040-2	007		~~	

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

A Pragmatic Assizement of Defense Contractor Risk, Profitability, and Debt: 1976-1984

by

David Joseph Louk Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy B.S., Virginia Commonwealth University, 1973

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 1987

ABSTRACT

This thesis is an investigation into the measurement and analysis of the relationship between defense contractor risk and profit levels as compared to commercially oriented firms' risk and profit levels. Past studies that have attempted to quantify the interrelationship of risk and profit are examined. Hurdle's leverage, risk, market structure, and profitability model is used as a basis for the current model of risk and profitability. Empirical analyses of defense contractor risk and profit relationships are performed using least squares regression analysis, Chow tests, and three stage simultaneous regression analysis.

- The s 126-3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INT	RODUCTION	7
	A.	PURPOSE	7
	в.	OVERVIEW	8
II.	MAR	TIN AND HURDLE ANALYSIS OF RISK AND PROFIT	10
	A.	MARTIN ANALYSIS	10
	в.	HURDLE ANALYSIS	11
	c.	EQUATIONS	15
	D.	HURDLE'S CONCLUSIONS	16
III.	THE	DATA AND METHODOLOGY	17
	Α.	THE DATA	17
	в.	METHODOLOGY	21
IV.	EMP:	IRICAL ANALYSIS	23
	A.	ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION	23
	в.	CHOW TEST ON STRAIGHT LINE REGRESSION	26
	c.	THREE STAGE REGRESSION EQUATIONS	27
v.	SUM	MARY AND CONCLUSIONS	34
APPENI	oix -		36
LIST (OF RI	EFERENCES	55
BIBLIC	OGRAI	PHY	56
INITIA	AL D	ISTRIBUTION LIST	57

LIST OF TABLES

1.	SAMPLE OF 24 COMMERCIALLY-ORIENTED CONTRACTORS	18
2.	SAMPLE OF 13 DEFENSE ORIENTED CONTRACTORS	19
3.	ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION VARIABLES	24
4.	CHOW TEST	26
5.	THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION DATA	28
6.	THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	29
7.	THREE-STAGE REGRESSION VARIABLES	30
8.	SEC DATA	3.7

LIST OF FIGURES

1.	Market Power		12
2.	Earnings on E	Equity	13

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

A. PURPOSE

Defense oriented firms have been studied extensively in the past to determine if the remuneration they receive is commensurate with a reasonable profit level. The defense industry is usually compared to the commercially oriented industry as a basis in profit level studies. The importance of equitable profit levels for defense firms is stated in the objectives of the <u>Defense Financial and Investment Review</u>, as, "Reform of federal procurement practices (are important) to insure the effective and efficient spending of public funds and at the same time maintain the viability of the defense industrial base." [Ref. 1:p. I-1]

Past studies of defense industry profitability have been attacked on numerous issues. Martin in his work on contractor risk points out, "previous studies have been widely criticized for biased premises, nonrepresentative samples, inaccurate data, and misleading variations in statistical averages." [Ref. 2:p. 10] In addition to the above inadequacies in previous studies, risk had not been factored in as a regulator of profit until Martin broached the risk factor in his study of the issue in An Empirical Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984. Martin says,

None of the prior studies has totally reconciled the fact that rates of return are not completely comparable for having been earned under varying exposures to risk. Rather than ask what defense contractors' observed rates of return are, a more appropriate question would be whether defense contractors are appropriately rewarded for creative and wise risk taking. [Ref. 2:p. 10]

The purpose of this study is to expand on Martin's work exploring the profit versus risk issue. A basis for this exploration is the model which was constructed by Gloria Hurdle in 1974. Hurdle's model, which analyzed a cross section of American firms, will be adapted to analyze commercial versus defense firms while measuring risk, profit, and debt.

This investigation will seek a determination of profit, or return on equity levels, for defense firms, and compare those levels to commercially oriented industries. The profit levels will be examined for the amount and influence of risk involved and the effect of risk on profit levels.

B. OVERVIEW

In order to comprehend the profit versus risk relationship, previous work on this relationship must be examined. Chapter II takes a look at Martin's work on contractor risk and Hurdle's model for measuring risk and profit.

With a solid foundation of knowledge of the profit versus risk issue, a model for measuring these factors in defense and commercial firms is developed in Chapter III. The empirical formulation of profit and risk levels is presented in what the author calls the Boger model.

Chapter IV attempts to empirically assess the results of the Boger model. Conclusions drawn from this assessment are presented in Chapter V.

II. MARTIN AND HURDLE ANALYSIS OF RISK AND PROFIT

This chapter explores some of the previous work that has been attempted in the field of risk and profit forecasting or the explanation of profit as a factor of risk. Both profit and risk are easily quantifiable, but as the following studies show, they are not easily captured in a model which makes simultaneous predictions of risk and/or profit.

A. MARTIN ANALYSIS

Wayne Martin in his paper, An Empirical Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984, "analyzed four possible methods for the evaluation and quantification of defense contractor risk." [Ref. 1:p. 121] Martin did a mean-variance analysis of rate of return, capital asset pricing model, mean-variance analysis of backlog, and mean-variance analysis of five-year defense program elements. Martin used 13 DOD oriented firms and 36 commercially oriented firms for his data base.

Martin's objective was to quantify the relationship between defense contractors' risk and rate of return. He showed that while risk can be empirically assessed and rate of return can easily be measured, the two factors do not fit smoothly in a simple model tying the two factors of risk and rate of return together.

B. HURDLE ANALYSIS

In 1974 Gloria Hurdle presented what will be called the Hurdle model. This model is a simultaneous three-equation regression model that looked at leverage, risk, market structure, and profitability. Hurdle's model attempted to explain and quantify the relationships that exist between leverage, market structure, risk, and profitability. Hurdle used 228 United States manufacturing firms that covered 85 different industries in the 1960's.

Hurdle based her model on previous studies completed by Hall and Weiss, 1967; Shepard, 1971, 1972; Stigler, 1963; Kilpatrick, 1968; Collins and Preston, 1969; and Gale, 1972. All of these authors "have included a risk variable or a financial structure variable or both in a linear regression model. They commonly represented the degree of risk by the variability of profit over time (hereafter denoted σ)."

[Ref. 3:p. 478]

According to Hurdle, stockholders are overwhelmingly risk averters who require a higher return, a risk premium as it were, for taking on more risk. Hurdle stated that when using profit variability for risk, its correlation with rate of return should be positive when the risk premium hypothesis is used. [Ref. 3:p. 478]

Hurdle stated that "there are two major hypotheses concerning risk and debt: (1) risk premium--high risk leads

to high rate of return. (2) debt--requires low business risk, but causes large financial risk." [Ref. 3:p. 478]

According to Hurdle, a business's risk should be low under a minimum of two conditions. The first condition is when the industry is riskless. The second condition is when the business has the power to maintain stable profit through control of the industry's price or market structure. Because of this, a third condition must be included. Market power lowers business risk and allows for higher debt and rate of return.

These relationships described by Hurdle are conceptually illustrated in Figure 1. [Ref. 3:p. 479]




Figure 1. Market Power

The coefficients of these variables in a regression will be unknown a priori regardless of the variable used to estimate the business risk. Hurdle stated in her paper, The upper loop indicates a positive relationship between business risk and return on equity, while the lower loop indicates a negative relationship. Similarly, the relationship between debt and profitability is unpredictable. If the bottom loop dominates then debt and profits would be positively correlated. However, if low debt reflects large business risk, then the upper loop implies a negative correlation between debt and profitability. [Ref. 3:p. 479]

Hurdle uses a graph to show how risk is related to earnings on equity when considering two different types of firms, one being risk averse and the other being less risk averse.

Figure 2 [Ref. 3:p. 479] shows the earnings on equity plotted against risk to stockholders. Curve I is the risk averse firm, while curve II is the less risk averse firm. Risk to stockholders includes both business and financial risk.




Figure 2. The Earnings-Risk Curve

Business risk varies from industry to industry, but it can be partially controlled by the firm, i.e., there is large inter-industry variation. Earnings and risk increase together up to some maximum (points A and A'), where the cost of debt becomes so high that earnings decrease with further debt. This is due to the rate of interest rising as debt increases. The firm is assumed to have a utility function, from which it decides the point on the earnings-risk curve which maximizes utility. The more horizontal the indifference curves, the more averse the risk to each firm is. Thus, the risk averse firm might choose point G, while a less risk averse firm would prefer point B.

Curve II represents a firm with an alternative market structure. The ability of a firm to control price should decrease its riskiness (business risk), which would allow it to increase its debt (and thus increase return on equity) without increasing risk to stockholders. Thus an advantaged firm (one with market power) would have an earnings-risk curve somewhat like curve II in Figure 2.

One can compare points on these two curves representing the same debt. Consider point B of Figure 2. This point represents some level of debt and some level of financial risk associated with that debt. One can locate the point on curve II corresponding to that same debt. Since financial risk corresponding to the same debt will be the same for both firms, but business risk will be lower for firm II, its risk to stockholders will be lower. Second, the earnings of firm II are higher because of its market power, plus the lower cost of its capital. Thus, B' (which represents the same debt as B) must lie somewhere between points D and E.

This diagram shows the relationships among risk, earnings, and leverage depending on the utility functions of firms and must therefore be determined empirically. For example, if firm I chooses point B, and firm II chooses point C, then firm II will have higher debt, higher earnings, and higher total risk to stockholders. On the other hand, if firm II chooses point F, it will have lower debt, lower risk and higher earnings. Debt, therefore, cannot be used to measure business risk, since both C and F have the same business risk but different levels of debt. [Ref. 3:p. 480]

C. EQUATIONS

Hurdle's hypotheses are that can be used to measure total risk and that financial structure reflects an opportunity for the businessman to increase return on equity. She employs three dependent variables which are risk, financial structure, and rate of return using a three-equation simultaneous regression model to test the hypothesis.

1. Risk

According to Hurdle, "a large market share or strong oligopoly group should reduce business risk, because market share is usually related to market power or the ability to control price." [Ref. 3:p. 480] Size can be used to spread loses which decrease . Business risk may be alleviated by advertising intensity because it creates market power and also because it is an expense which can be cut when profits start to drop off.

2. Debt

"High-risk firms should have lower debt." [Ref. 3:p. 480] Hurdle also states that fast growing firms are likely to have high debt. The reasons for this are that the firm may be out of equilibrium due to fast or unexpected growth. Another reason for high debt among fast growth firms is that stockholders prefer debt for financing growth instead of new stock issues which dilute equity.

3. Profits

Hurdle's premise is that, "market share and the extent of oligopoly should be correlated with higher profits by allowing firms some control over price." [Ref. 3:p. 480]

The equations to describe debt, risk, and profit are:

Profit = constant + market share + advertising ± assets + concentration of market ± debt ± risk

D. HURDLE'S CONCLUSIONS

Hurdle's research enabled her to make a tentative indication that while market power keeps risk at a lower level than firms with low-market power, both high and low-market power firms have about the same relative levels of debt. Market structure (i.e., control over price) is the determining factor for profit differences among similar firms.

III. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the data sources and methodology used in the analysis of the data. The empirical formulation of the data is presented in the Boger model.

A. THE DATA

The data base has its foundation in Martin's work, An Empirical Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984 [Ref. 2]. Martin based his work on 49 different companies for the years 1976-1984 broken into two groups consisting of 36 commercially oriented firms and 13 defense oriented firms. The 36 commercially oriented firms had less than 30 percent Department of Defense sales, and the 13 defense firms had greater than 30 percent Department of Defense sales.

This investigation uses the same 49 companies for the years 1976-1984 as a basis. This group of firms has been reduced to 13 defense firms and 24 commercially oriented firms. The reduction in commercially oriented firms is due to the lack of backlog data for the 12 discarded firms. The 37 firms used in this work are contained in Tables 1 and 2.

Each company has nine variables used in this study which are contained in the Appendix. These nine variables are discussed below.

TABLE 1
SAMPLE OF 24 COMMERCIALLY-ORIENTED CONTRACTORS

Company	NYSE Symbol
AVCO Corporation	AV
Control Data Corporation	CDA
E-Systems, Inc.	ESY
Emerson Electric Company	EMR
Fairchild Industries, Inc.	FEN
General Electric Company	GE
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.	GT
Gould, Inc.	GLD
Harris Corporation	HRS
Hercules, Inc.	HPC
Honeywell, Inc.	HON
International Business Machines	IBM
Motorola, Inc.	MOT
Penn Central Corporation	PC
RCA Corporation	RCA
The Signal Companies, Inc.	SGN
Singer Company	SMF
Sperry Corporation	SY
TRW Inc.	TRW
Teledyne, Inc.	TDY
Tenneco, Inc.	TGT
Textron, Inc.	TXT
Todd Shipyards Corp.	TOD
Westinghouse Electric Corp.	WX

TABLE 2
SAMPLE OF 13 DOD-ORIENTED CONTRACTORS

Company	NYSE Symbol
Boeing Company	BA
FMC Corporation	FMC
General Dynamics Corporation	GD
Grumman Corporation	GQ
Litton Industries Inc.	LIT
Lockheed Corporation	LK
Martin Marietta Corporation	ML
McDonnell Douglas Corporation	MD
Northrop Corporation	NOC
Raytheon Company	RTN
Rockwell International Corp.	ROK
Sanders Associates, Inc.	SAA
United Technologies Corp.	UTX

Backlog (BKLG) consists of those orders which cannot currently be delivered but will be filled within a later time period. Backlog data was collected from the SEC 10K reports in the same manner as described in Martin's An Empirical Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984 [Ref. 1:p. 110].

Debt (DEBT) is defined as the total liabilities of a firm as reported on the SEC 10K reports.

Assets (ASST) is defined as the total assets of a firm as reported on the SEC 10K reports.

Profit variation (PVAR) is a proxy variable for risk.

PVAR is the result of taking the current year rate of return

minus the mean rate of return for the years 1976-1984 and

squaring the result.

Leverage (LEV) is the result of the current year debt divided by the sum of current year debt and current year shareholders' equity.

Assets divided by sales (ASSAL) is current year assets divided by current year sales for the year in question.

Sales (SALES) are a revenue transaction where goods or services are delivered to a customer in return for cash or an obligation to pay. Sales figures were taken directly from each firm's SEC 10K reports.

Shareholders' equity (SHEQ) is the owners' equity of each firm. Shareholders' equity was taken directly from each firm's SEC 10K reports.

Return on equity (ROE) is the rate of return on common shareholders equity calculated as:

B. METHODOLOGY

The methodology of the equations involved as derived from Hurdle's model [Ref. 3:p. 481] discussed earlier in Chapter II. Hurdle used three equations to describe risk, debt, and profits. The three equations, with their expected signs are described and contrasted below.

Hurdle's equation for risk is:

Risk = constant - market share - advertising - asset - concentration of market + (total assets/sales) + debt + demand variance

Boger's equation for risk is:

PVAR = constant - backlog + leverage - asset

In the Boger model, backlog is used to capture market share, concentration of market, demand variance, and advertising used in Hurdle's equation. Debt was captured by the same method used by Hurdle, but is called leverage in the Boger model. Recall that leverage is the result of debt divided by the sum of debt and shareholders' equity.

Hurdle's equation for debt is:

Boger's equation for debt is:

Once again, market share, growth in sales, and concentration of market are captured in backlog. Hurdle's profit is stated in the Boger equation as return on equity. Risk is measured by the term PVAR. The other terms in the two equations are the same except for debt. Debt in the Boger model is simply the current year total debt.

Hurdle's final equation is for profit.

Profit = constant + market share + advertising ± asset + concentration of market ± debt ± risk

The Boger profit equation is:

Return on equity = constant + backlog - leverage - asset + PVAR

As before, backlog was used to capture the esoteric terms (market share, advertising, and concentration of market) used in the Hurdle model. The other terms remain the same.

IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the empirical analysis and the implications of this analysis. The methods of investigation are ordinary single equation regression for the combined firms, defense firms, and the commercial firms; Chow tests on the regression of individual years, and regression of three simultaneous equations for the combined years of 1976-1984.

A. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION

The data contained in Table 3 show how the regressions for the Boger model compare to the Hurdle model for the year 1984. Similar results were obtained for the years 1983-1984. Results for the Boger model were in most cases not statistically significant.

The following differences were observed when comparing both defense firms and commercial firms combined to the Hurdle model. Profit variability is reduced by the constant factor in the Boger model for risk and is increased in the Hurdle model. The reason is that the profit variable is a fairly static term over the long run, and the constant is negative to dampen out the effects of the other variables in the equation. The Boger debt model has two variables which differ from the Hurdle debt model. These terms are profit variability and assets divided by sales. Profit variability

TABLE 3

ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION VARIABLES COMBINED FIRMS

ROE = Constant + BKLG - LEV - ASST + PVAR	Boger
ROE = Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK	Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV - ASST	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + Debt - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR + ASST - ASSAL	Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - PVAR + ASST + ASSAL	Hurdle
DEFENSE FIRMS	
ROE = Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST + PVAR	Boger
ROE = Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK	Hurdle
	`
PVAR = -Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = -Constant + BKLG + ROE + PVAR + ASST - ASSAL	Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - PVAR + ASST + ASSAL	Hurdle
COMMERCIAL FIRMS	
ROE = Constant + BKLG - LEV + ASST + PVAR	Boger
ROE = Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK	Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV - ASST	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR + ASST - ASSAL	Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - PVAR + ASST + ASSAL	Hurdle

is a positive variable in the Boger model, while in the Hurdle model it is negative. The reason for this is that risk or profit variability tends to increase the debt load rather than decrease it. Hurdle found the same evidence for the years 1960 and 1964 in her work but chose to state that risk decreases the debt load.

Assets divided by sales have a negative influence on debt in the Boger model while the opposite is true for the Hurdle model. Debt is commonly employed to increase assets which in turn increase sales. It follows then that assets divided by sales would have a calming effect or negative effect on overall debt.

The comparison of the Boger model to the Hurdle model on defense firms only and commercial firms only yields the same results as above with two exceptions. The constant in the Boger model for defense firms for the debt equation has a negative effect as opposed to Hurdle's positive effect. Once again this is a dampening effect for the other variables in the equation. The other exception is that in the Boger risk equation backlog increases risk while in the Hurdle risk equation backlog decreases risk. The reason for this difference in the Boger model is that defense firms with a large backlog are more likely to have higher risk because of their inability to secure new contracts due to that large backlog.

B. CHOW TEST ON STRAIGHT LINE REGRESSION

A Chow test was performed on the results of the regression equation's sum of squares residuals for the combination of defense and commercial firms, defense firms only, and commercial firms only. The results of this Chow test are presented in Table 4.

TABLE 4
CHOW TEST

	ROE	5% ——	CRITICAL VALUE		5% CRITICAL VALUE	DEBT	5% CRITICAL VALUE
1984	2.03		2.57	.17	2.70	.38	2.49
1983	3.38			.99		.46	
1982	1.69			1.76		.65	
1981	4:15			3.87		3.89	
1980	1.60			.46		.42	
1979	.37			.20		. 57	
1978	1.04			10.56		.84	
1977	1.38			.73		.64	
1976	1.02			.91		1.60	

The data from the years 1976-1984 were pooled to perform the Chow tests. Pooling was performed by combining all the years and comparing that to the combination of previous years plus the present year. An example makes this concept clearer. The years in this example are 1979-1984. All of

the data from 1979 through 1984 are combined and compared to the data from the years 1980 through 1984 plus the data from 1979.

The Chow test showed that defense and commercial firms are the same with respect to profit, debt, and risk with five exceptions over nine years. In 1983 profit showed a significant difference but risk and debt did not. In 1981 profit, debt, and risk all showed significant differences between commercial and defense firms. This may be ascribed to the booming defense economy and the lagging commercial economy occurring at that time. The remaining difference is the risk in 1978. This may be an anomaly. All five exceptions need scrutinizing that is beyond the scope of this work to fully understand. It is concluded that all time series observations may be pooled with cross section observations.

In conjunction with the above discussion of the tests it should be stated that a two-stage least-squares simultaneous regression of all years combined was performed on all the data. The results of the two-stage regression were inconclusive.

C. THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES MODEL

A regression analysis for the years 1976-1984 combined was completed on the firms under investigation. This regression analysis was a three-stage least squares model performed on the three simultaneous equations for debt,

profit variability, and profit using the Boger model. The analysis was completed on all firms combined, defense oriented firms only, and commercially oriented firms only.

The data in Tables 5 and 6 compare and contrast the differences that arose between the data bases of combined, defense only, and commercial only firms. These differences are discussed in the section following Table 7.

TABLE 5
THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION DATA

COMBINED FIRMS

DEPENDENT		PROFIT	
VARIABLE	ROE	VARIABILITY	DEBT
Com of Company Desiduels	10006 0	20207700	F7026000
Sum of Squared Residuals	19986.9	39297700	57936900
Standard Error	7.74	343.5	1319
Mean	14.7	68.4	2389.7
Standard Deviation	9.6	356.1	2607.6
R-Squared	.355	.06	.743
R-Squared Adjusted	.357	.07	.744
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.8	2.01	1.8

DEFENSE FIRMS

Sum of Squared Residuals	5575.1	22179700	6215930
Standard Error	6.9	138.2	231.4
Mean	16.25	56.1	1778.2
Standard Deviation	7.9	145.6	1281.9
R-Squared	.241	.091	.96
R-Squared Adjusted	.247	.099	.96
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.85	2.1 .	2.1

COMMERCIAL FIRMS

Sum of Squares Residual Standard Error	13129.5 7.7	36693300 412.1	53633400 1575.7
Mean	13.8	74.7	2759.7
Standard Deviation	10.3	429.2	3049.1
R-Squared	.42	.07	.731
R-Squared Adjusted	.43	.08	.732
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.9	1.9	1.9

TABLE 6

THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
(Standard Errors in Parentheses Below Each Coefficient)

	COMBINED	DEFENSE	COMMERCIAL
ROE			
Constant	14.5 (1.8)	6.1 (3.3)	17.6 (2.14
Backlog	.00019	.0004	0005 (.0002)
Leverage	1.12 (3.1)	21.5 (5.25)	-5.6 (3.5)
Assets	.000058	0008 (.0005)	.0001 (.00008)
Profit Variability	016 (.12)	02 (.004)	01 (.002)
PROFIT VARIABILITY			
Constant	-327.1 (81.1)	-48.2 (66.8)	-418.2 (110.3)
Backlog	11 (.008)	.014 (.008)	01 (.01)
Leverage	721.6	244.6	887.1 (176.8)
Assets	0001 (.002)	03 (.01)	.0003
DEBT			
Constant	389.1 (174.6)	-421.4 (68.9)	564.7 (244.1)
Backlog	.17	.013	.2 (.05)
ROE	3.13 (9.2)	15.1 (2.9)	17 (14.5)
Profit Variability	.37 (.45)	.78 (.16)	.41 (.6)
Assets	.35	.58	.32
Assets/Sales	33.8 (38.6)	211.4 (25.7)	33.9 (52.8)

The data contained in Table 7 shows how the Boger model compares to the Hurdle model for the combined years 1976-1984. It is interesting to note how closely the Boger model approximates the Hurdle model when three-stage simultaneous

TABLE 7

THREE-STAGE REGRESSION VARIABLES

COMBINED FIRMS

ROE = Constant + BKLG + LEV + SST - PVAR	Boger
ROE = Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK	Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV - ASST	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG + ROE + PVAR	
+ ASST + ASSAL	Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - RISK	
+ ASST + ASSAL	Hurdle
DEFENSE FIRMS	
ROE = Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST - PVAR	Boger
ROE = Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK	Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = -Constant + BKLG + ROE + PVAR	
+ ASST + ASSAL	Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - RISK	

+ ASST + ASSAL

Hurdle

COMMERCIAL FIRMS

ROE = Constant - BKLG - LEV + ASST - PVAR Boger

ROE = Constant + BKLG ± DEBT ± ASST ± RISK Hurdle

PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV + ASST Boger

RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST Hurdle

DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR + ASST + ASSAL Boger

DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - RISK + ASST + ASSAL Hurdle

for debt, while in the Hurdle model for debt, risk (profit variability) has a negative effect. The reason for this variance is the same as stated earlier for the least squares regression of individual years model discussed previously in this chapter. Risk or profit variability tends to increase the debt load rather than decrease the debt load as Hurdle concluded.

All other independent variables in the combined years for the Boger models on debt, profit, and risk have the same effects as the independent variables in the Hurdle model. It must be noted that profit variability for the Boger debt model of combined firms was not statistically significant, displaying a t-ratio of less than one.

When comparing the defense only firms and the commercial only firms using the Boger model against the Hurdle model,

COMMERCIAL FIRMS

ROE = Constant - BKLG - LEV + ASST - PVAR Boger

 $ROE = Constant + BKLG \pm DEBT \pm ASST \pm RISK$ Hurdle

PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV + ASST Boger

RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST Hurdle

DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR + ASST + ASSAL Boger

DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - RISK + ASST + ASSAL Hurdle

regression is used instead of the ordinary least squares regression described earlier in this chapter.

The constant terms in the regression equations are discounted for their positive or negative effects when compared to the Hurdle model. The following differences came to light when comparing both defense and commercial firms combined in the Boger model to the Hurdle model. Profit variability is a positive variable in the Boger model for debt, while in the Hurdle model for debt, risk (profit variability) has a negative effect. The reason for this variance is the same as stated earlier for the least squares regression of individual years model discussed previously in this chapter. Risk or profit variability tends to increase the debt load rather than decrease the debt load as Hurdle concluded.

All other independent variables in the combined years for the Boger models on debt, profit, and risk have the same effects as the independent variables in the Hurdle model. It must be noted that profit variability for the Boger debt model of combined firms was not statistically significant, displaying a t-ratio of less than one.

When comparing the defense only firms and the commercial only firms using the Boger model against the Hurdle model, the profit variability described above carries over to both defense only and commercial only firms. In fact, the heavy influence of the Boger debt model independent variable profit variability in defense firms influences the combined firms and the commercially oriented firms to a significant degree when all three are combined.

The other exception for the defense firms is that the Boger model has backlog increasing the risk while the Hurdle model has backlog decreasing the risk factor. The fact that the positive effect of backlog on risk carries over from ordinary least squares regression to the combined years three-stage regression further strengthens the previous explanation of defense backlog. Namely, large backlogs are detrimental to defense firms attempting to secure new contracts.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The overall purpose of this study was to explore the relationship and effects of risk to profit levels in defense firms as compared to commercial firms. This involved a look at the past studies of Martin and Hurdle.

Hurdle's models for debt, profit, and risk were adapted to defense firms and commercially oriented firms in the Boger model. This provides a tool to evaluate the integrated relationship of profit, risk, and leverage among defense contractors.

It has become clear from this study that models such as Hurdle's see the financial structure of firms in the long run with an economic point of view. That is to say that the market forces of the economy will tend to reach an achievable and predictable state over a period of many years.

The Boger model demonstrates that defense firms are managed with a short run view of the economy. The accounting models of the economy look at the present year data and performance while discounting past or future trends. This accountant's point of view has been shown by the effect of backlog on profit variability and in turn the effect of profit variability on the debt structure. As was

seen, backlog increases risk in the Boger model, and risk of profit variability increases debt.

Defense firms must operate in a short run mode due to the capricious nature of Department of Defense contracts and congressional impact on operations. Because defense firms must operate differently than commercially oriented firms, defense firms should not be judged by the same models used to measure profitability in commercially oriented firms.

APPENDIX

The following table (Table 8) shows the data for the individual defense and commercial firms. The data are listed by firm number which corresponds to an individual firm. The following list is used to identify the firms.

Firm #	Firm Name
1	Boeing Company
2	FMC Corporation
3	General Dynamics Corporation
4	Grumman Corporation
	Litton Industries Incorporated
5 6	Lockheed Corporation
7	Martin Marietta Corporation
8	McDonnel Douglas Corporation
9	Northrup Corporation
10	Raytheon Company
11	Rockwell International Corporation
12	Sanders Associates, Incorporated
13	United Technologies Corporation
14	Avco Corporation
15	Control Data Corporation
16	E-Systems, Incorporated
17	Emerson Electric Company
18	Fairchild Industries, Incorporated
19	General Electric Company
20	Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
21	Gould, Incorporated
22	Harris Corporation
23	Hercules, Incorporated
24	Honeywell, Incorporated
25	International Business Machines
26	Motorola, Incorporated
27	Penn Central Corporation
28	RCA Corporation
29	The Signals Companies, Incorporated
30	Singer Company
31	Sperry Corporation
32	TRW Incorporated
33	Teledyne, Incorporated
34	Tenneco, Incorporated
35	Textron, Incorporated
36	Todd Shipyards Corporation
37	Westinghouse Electric Corporation

TABLE 8

SEC DATA

IMMWY	605.6 605.6	920.39 662.59	547.7 995.6	322.097	331.796	026.898	819.299	898.799	7947.000	1399 399	995.799	571.000	5185.097 7163.000	5534.000	569.099	111.59	518.799	914.000	16C. 190	939.000	221.099	22.299 64.500
.2500	3.2400	6.4899	4.8100 9.0000	2.0900	.5600	7.2099	6.2500	92.4099	0.0400	2.2500	4.8100	2.5600	6./600	9.6100	.7600	.2500	6.0000	9.6100	0019.6	57.2099	7.8400	3600.
485.0000 400.0000 034.7998	379.8984 166 0000	224.2998 191.2968	797.00006	869.5000 526.2998	904.5000	588.8984	415.1999	928.7998	730.0000	194.2968	696.7998	2388.5000	1392.0000	4194.0000	766.1999	220.6992	470.0000	502.5976	700 4000	079.0000	210.0000	838.0000 150.3984
790.0000 500.1999 972.7998	369.0000 014.0998	598.2998 847.5000	072.1999 620.8999	347.8999 209.0000	735.0976	813.2968	129.2999	705.8999	157.0000	0.000 598 3999	878.6999	021.5998	5/8.8999 903.0000	916.0000	147.0000	150.6992	986.2998	6669.669	0002 (27	639.0000	022.2998	253.0999 409.5976
895.0976 823.2998 630.6992	797.0000 605.1992	929.5000 282.0000	067.5998 483.0000	020.0000	582 5000	132.0000	769.3999	520.6999	030.1992	93.7998	031.0000	585.0000	604.0000 944.0000	110.3999	637.8999	059.7998 841.0000	720.0000	803.7998	432.0000	700.0000	600.0000	500.0000
	895.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 823.29980 1500.19995 2400.00000 88.35999 33 630.69922 1972.79980 361.00000 78	895.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 823.259980 1500.19995 2400.00000 88.35999 33 630.69922 1972.79980 3034.79980 361.00000 78 764.00000 901.59985 1445.19995 5.29000 26 75.19922 270.00000 2369.00000 4379.89844 3.24000 45 75.100000 25 716.00000 270.000000 270.00000 270.00000 270.00000 270.00000 270.00000 270.00000 270.00000 270.00000 270.00000 270.00000 270.00000 270.00000 270.000000 270.000000 270.000000 270.000000 270.000000 270.000000 270.000000 270.000000 270.000000 270.000000 270.000000 270.000000 270.000000 270.0000000000	895.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 823.29980 1500.19995 2400.0000 88.35999 33 630.69922 1972.79980 3034.79980 361.0000 78 764.00000 901.59985 1445.19995 5.29000 26 797.00000 2369.0000 4379.89844 3.24000 46 605.19922 2014.09985 3166.0000 72.24998 81 929.50000 3847.50000 6191.29688 2.89000 96	895.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 823.29980 1500.19995 2400.0000 188.35999 33 630.69922 1972.79980 361.0000 78 764.00000 901.59985 1445.19995 361.0000 26 797.00000 2369.0000 4379.8984 3.24000 26 605.19922 2014.09985 3166.0000 72.24998 81 929.50000 1598.29980 2224.29980 86.48999 39 282.00000 3847.50000 6191.29688 2.89000 96 667.59985 1072.19995 1797.00000 34.81000 25 483.0000 1620.89990 3600.09985 9.00000 59	895.09766 4790.0000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 823.29980 1500.19995 2400.00000 88.35999 33 650.69922 1972.79980 3034.79980 361.00000 78 754.00000 2569.00000 4379.89844 3.24000 265000 265.19922 2014.09985 3166.00000 72.24998 81 825.00000 3847.50000 6191.29688 2.89900 367.59985 1072.19995 1797.00000 34.81000 25 640.50000 3347.89990 560.009985 9.00000 93 4.81000 560.500000 560.500000 560.500000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.500000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.500000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 560.50000 56	895.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 823.29980 1500.19995 2600.0000 88.35999 38 823.29980 1500.19995 2600.0000 88.3599 38 823.29980 1500.19995 3034.79980 361.00000 78 864.00000 2369.0000 4379.89844 3.24000 26 865.19922 2014.09985 3166.00000 72.24998 81 865.29980 865.48999 39 865.29980 1620.89990 3600.09985 9.00000 52 883.00000 3847.50000 6191.29688 2.89000 95 865.29980 1620.89990 3600.09985 9.00000 52 8660.50000 3347.89990 5869.50000 32.209000 93 866.29980 1620.89990 5869.50000 32.209000 93 866.29980 1620.89990 5869.50000 32.209000 93 866.29980 1620.89990 5869.50000 32.209000 93 866.29980 1620.89990 5869.50000 32.209000 93	895.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 825.29980 1500.19995 3034.79980 361.00000 78 825.29980 1500.19995 3034.79980 361.00000 78 764.00000 2369.00000 4379.89844 3.24000 26 797.00000 2369.00000 4379.89844 3.24000 26 805.19922 2014.09985 3166.00000 72.24998 81 929.50000 2224.29980 86.48999 39 282.00000 3847.5000 6191.29688 2.89000 96 483.00000 3847.89990 3600.09985 36.8100 25 483.00000 3847.89990 3600.09985 36.8000 25 605.0000 3547.89990 36.9000 25 09000 25 606.50000 579.0000 576.000 25 09000 25 09000 25 09000 25 09000 25 09000 15 25 09000 15 25 09000 15 25 09000 15 25 09000 15 25	95.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 25.0980 1500.19995 2400.0000 88.35999 33 30.69922 1972.79980 361.0000 78 64.00000 2369.0000 1445.19995 5.29000 26 97.00000 2369.0000 1598.29980 36.224.2998 36.48999 39 29.50000 1598.29980 2224.29980 86.48999 39 36	895.09766 4790.0000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 823.29980 1500.19995 2400.00000 8485.00000 848.35999 33 825.09980 1972.79980 361.00000 78 75.00000 2369.00000 4379.19995 5.29000 264.00000 2369.00000 4379.89844 72.24998 81000 2569.00000 2224.29980 86.48999 39 29.50000 3847.50000 6191.29688 2.89000 95 86.48999 39 820.00000 3847.50000 6191.29688 2.89000 95 86.48999 1072.19995 1797.00000 34.81000 25 89000 95 860.59985 1072.19995 1797.00000 34.81000 25 89000 1620.89990 5869.50000 22.09000 93 860.50000 5735.09766 9904.50000 2.56000 163 87.20999 588 52 89990 1110.39990 2978.79980 6.25000 886.4999 888 9588.89844 37.20999 88 707.39990 1110.39990 2978.79980 292.40991 88	895.09766	895.09766 4790.0000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 823.29980 1500.19995 2400.00000 88.35999 33 650.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 88.35999 33 650.09922 1972.79980 3034.79980 361.00000 264.00000 2369.00000 4455.19995 5.29000 26 675.19995 3.24000 46 675.19995 3.24000 2224.29980 22.24998 81 675.19995 22.29980 22.24998 39 625.00000 3847.50000 6191.29688 2.89000 25 69000 3847.50000 6191.29688 22.09000 25 6915.50000 25 6915.50000 25 6915.50000 25 6915.50000 25 6915.50000 25 6915.50000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 69100 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 6915.20000 25 69100 25 69100 25 6915.200000 25 6915.200000 25 6915.200000 25 691000 25 6915.200000 25 6915.200000 25 6915.200000 25 69100000 25 6915.200000 25 69100000 25 691000000000000000000000000000000000000	895.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 823.29980 1500.19995 2400.0000 88.35999 33 823.29980 1500.19995 2400.0000 38.35999 33 630.69922 1972.79980 3034.79980 361.00000 26 797.00000 2369 1445.19995 5.29000 26 797.00000 2369 2224.29980 86.48999 36 822.00000 3847.5000 6191.29688 2.89000 96 822.00000 3847.5000 6191.29688 2.89000 96 822.00000 3847.5000 6191.29688 2.89000 96 822.00000 3847.5000 6191.29688 2.89000 96 83.00000 3247.8990 3600.09985 9.00000 93 843.00000 3247.8990 3600.09985 9.00000 93 840.50000 3256.29980 36.20990 9.28690 9.00000 840.50000 3256.29980 37.2099 9.28690 9.00000 850.50000 3257.6988 9588.89844 37.2099 9.00000	895.09766	85.5.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 823.5.9926 1972.79980 3034.79980 361.00000 78 823.6.9922 1972.79980 3034.79980 361.00000 78 764.00000 2369.00000 4379.8936 361.00000 26 797.00000 2369.00000 4379.8936 36.26900 26 797.00000 2369.00000 4379.8936 36.60000 26 867.59985 3166.00000 36.48999 36.869.5000 36.86999 36.86999 878.00000 3847.89990 3600.09985 2.89000 36.8999	895.09766 4790.0000 8485.00000 12.25000 103 823.29980 1590.00000 8485.00000 88.35999 78 64.00000 2369.00000 4379.89844 3.24000 26 797.00000 2369.00000 4379.89844 3.24000 26 797.00000 2369.00000 4379.89844 3.24000 26 797.00000 2369.00000 4379.89844 3.24000 26 797.00000 3347.89980 2224.29980 86.48999 39 707.9985 1072.89990 3600.0000 34.81000 25 700.00000 3347.89990 3600.00000 22.09000 93 700.00000 3347.89990 3600.0000 22.09000 93 700.00000 5735.09766 9904.50000 22.89000 16 700.00000 5735.09766 9904.50000 22.89000 16 700.00000 5735.09766 9904.50000 22.89000 16 707.39990 1110.39990 2979.59985 6.010000 279 707.39990 1110.39990 2979.59980 292.40991 88 707.39990 1453.00000 24730.00000 6.04000 279 707.39990 1453.00000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 1453.00000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 1453.00000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 1453.00000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 1453.00000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 24730.00000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 24730.00000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 24730.00000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 24730.00000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 6194.29688 12.25000 102 708.39990 10000 6194.20000 6194.20000 6194.20000 6194.200000 6194.20000 6	895.09766 4790.0000 8485.00000 10.25500 10.38.35999 78 895.09766 4790.0000 8485.00000 10.25500 10.38 35999 78 864.00000 2369.00000 4379.89844 3.24000 26 46 <td>895.2998 361.0000 78 895.2998 1972.7998 361.0000 78 895.2998 1972.7998 361.0000 78 896.6992 1972.7998 361.0000 78 764.0000 2369.0000 4379.8984 3.24000 26 797.0000 2369.0000 4379.8984 3.24000 26 797.0000 2369.0000 4379.8984 3.24000 26 797.0000 2367.5000 46 226 29 86 48 89 86 48 89 86 48 89 86 48 89 86 48 89 86 48 89 89 86 48 89</td> <td>895.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 103 895.29986 4790.00000 8485.00000 361.0000 78 895.29980 361.0000 78 35900 26 764.00000 901.59985 1445.19995 529000 26 797.00000 2369.0000 4379.89844 3.24000 46 797.00000 2369.0000 46 48.39844 48.36000 48.48999 282.00000 3847.5090 6191.29688 22.48990 36.48999 36.8990</td> <td>895.09766 4790.00000 2485.00000 18.35999 823.29986 4790.00000 2485.00000 361.0000 864.00000 361.0000 2400.0000 361.0000 864.00000 2369.0000 361.0000 2600.0000 865.1995 361.0000 361.0000 361.0000 866.1998 361.0000 361.0000 361.0000 867.5000 362.224.2998 36.2898 36.2898 867.5000 361.0000 3647.5000 36.2888 867.5000 361.0000 36.2888 36.888 867.5000 36.2988 36.888 36.888 867.5000 36.2888 36.888 36.888 867.5000 36.2888 36.888 36.888 867.5000 36.2888 36.888 37.2099 867.5000 36.888 37.2099 36.2888 868.5000 36.8888 37.2099 36.2888 869.5000 36.8888 37.2099 36.2888 869.5000 36.8888 37.2099</td> <td>895.0976 4790.0000 2485.0000 85.2900 78 825.2986 4790.0000 2485.0000 81.2500 78 825.2986 470.0000 2485.0000 82.2900 78 764.0000 2369.0000 364.7995 361.0000 78 797.0000 2369.0000 367.7988 361.0000 26 797.0000 2369.0000 367.5988 36.4899 36.4899 282.0000 3847.5000 6191.2968 2.8900 36.8900 282.0000 3847.5000 6191.2968 2.8900 36.8900 282.0000 3847.5000 6191.2968 2.8900 36.8900 282.0000 3847.5000 5869.5000 36.8900 36.8900 36.8900 460.5000 3347.8990 5869.5000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000<</td> <td>895.29980 1500.19995 2400.0000 88.5990 103 823.29980 1500.19995 2400.0000 88.5990 26 823.29980 1500.19995 304.79980 361.0000 26 820.69922 1972.79980 3034.7980 361.0000 26 820.69922 2014.09985 165.1995 35.2900 26 821.09000 2369.0000 3647.5000 36.6988 2.284.64899 36.6988 36.68999 36.6988 36.8698 36.8698 36.86989 36.8698 36.8</td> <td>895 1976 1995 2400 1000 8823.29980 12.25000 105 823 29986 1500 19995 2400 1000 12.25000 105 764 10000 236 10000 261 1000 261 261 261 261</td>	895.2998 361.0000 78 895.2998 1972.7998 361.0000 78 895.2998 1972.7998 361.0000 78 896.6992 1972.7998 361.0000 78 764.0000 2369.0000 4379.8984 3.24000 26 797.0000 2369.0000 4379.8984 3.24000 26 797.0000 2369.0000 4379.8984 3.24000 26 797.0000 2367.5000 46 226 29 86 48 89 86 48 89 86 48 89 86 48 89 86 48 89 86 48 89 89 86 48 89	895.09766 4790.00000 8485.00000 103 895.29986 4790.00000 8485.00000 361.0000 78 895.29980 361.0000 78 35900 26 764.00000 901.59985 1445.19995 529000 26 797.00000 2369.0000 4379.89844 3.24000 46 797.00000 2369.0000 46 48.39844 48.36000 48.48999 282.00000 3847.5090 6191.29688 22.48990 36.48999 36.8990	895.09766 4790.00000 2485.00000 18.35999 823.29986 4790.00000 2485.00000 361.0000 864.00000 361.0000 2400.0000 361.0000 864.00000 2369.0000 361.0000 2600.0000 865.1995 361.0000 361.0000 361.0000 866.1998 361.0000 361.0000 361.0000 867.5000 362.224.2998 36.2898 36.2898 867.5000 361.0000 3647.5000 36.2888 867.5000 361.0000 36.2888 36.888 867.5000 36.2988 36.888 36.888 867.5000 36.2888 36.888 36.888 867.5000 36.2888 36.888 36.888 867.5000 36.2888 36.888 37.2099 867.5000 36.888 37.2099 36.2888 868.5000 36.8888 37.2099 36.2888 869.5000 36.8888 37.2099 36.2888 869.5000 36.8888 37.2099	895.0976 4790.0000 2485.0000 85.2900 78 825.2986 4790.0000 2485.0000 81.2500 78 825.2986 470.0000 2485.0000 82.2900 78 764.0000 2369.0000 364.7995 361.0000 78 797.0000 2369.0000 367.7988 361.0000 26 797.0000 2369.0000 367.5988 36.4899 36.4899 282.0000 3847.5000 6191.2968 2.8900 36.8900 282.0000 3847.5000 6191.2968 2.8900 36.8900 282.0000 3847.5000 6191.2968 2.8900 36.8900 282.0000 3847.5000 5869.5000 36.8900 36.8900 36.8900 460.5000 3347.8990 5869.5000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000 36.8000<	895.29980 1500.19995 2400.0000 88.5990 103 823.29980 1500.19995 2400.0000 88.5990 26 823.29980 1500.19995 304.79980 361.0000 26 820.69922 1972.79980 3034.7980 361.0000 26 820.69922 2014.09985 165.1995 35.2900 26 821.09000 2369.0000 3647.5000 36.6988 2.284.64899 36.6988 36.68999 36.6988 36.8698 36.8698 36.86989 36.8698 36.8	895 1976 1995 2400 1000 8823.29980 12.25000 105 823 29986 1500 19995 2400 1000 12.25000 105 764 10000 236 10000 261 1000 261 261 261 261

3654301098765430109876543010 365430109876543010987654301

Source: 10K Reports

R0E8	23. 250000 25. 89999 13. 809099 25. 89999 25. 89999 25. 89999 26. 00000 10. 80000 10. 80000
SHEQ8	3695.00000 1062.00000 543.59985 2010.89990 1151.89990 2343.79980 724.79980 1979.19995 2521.59986 4169.39886 1775.59986 1775.59986 12573.00000 1775.69996 285.89990 285.89990 285.89990 12573.00000 285.89990 285.89990 285.89990 12573.00000 1156.89990 286.89990 286.89990 286.89990 286.89990 286.89990 2878.00000 2878.00000 2878.00000 2878.00000 2878.00000 2878.00000000000000000000000000000000000
LEV8	0.65646 0.656886 0.656886 0.656886 0.65688666666666666666666666666666666666
SSAL 8	0.81949 0.55508 0.55508 0.640737 0.660651 0.60646 0.60

DEBT83 433.00000 2752.39990 575.19995 635.29980 1087.69995 169.79980 2836.19995 169.79980 1087.69995 1087.69995 1087.69995 1085.20000 108.000000 108.00000 108.00000 108.00000 108.00000 108.00000 108.0000000000	2476.59985 4663.59766 5492.89844 2979.00000 8779.79980 788.09985
BKLG83 DEBT83 ASSI8 43.19922 4433.0000 7471.0000 88.69995 1292.00000 2752.3999 42.29688 1575.19995 2836.1999 90.00000 2169.79980 2836.1999 91.00000 2169.79980 2830.0999 91.00000 2723.8999 1087.6999 83.00000 2723.8999 4791.7968 84.00000 2723.8999 4791.7968 85.00000 2723.8999 4791.7968 86.00000 2723.8999 4791.7968 86.00000 2863.7998 2830.0998 86.00000 2863.7998 4791.7968 86.00000 2863.7998 4781.0976 86.00000 370.5998 466.1999 86.00000 370.5998 466.1999 86.00000 370.5998 466.1999 87.00000 370.5998 466.1999 887.0998 466.1999 4787.6998 887.0998 4787.6998 4687.6999 887.0998 4687.6999 4687	26.0000 24.00000 19.3599 16.26999 26.00999 4.0000
BKLG83 43.19922 443.19922 88.69995 1292.0000 120.00000 2169.7998 83.00000 2169.7998 83.00000 2169.7998 83.00000 83.00000 84.00000 85.00000 86.00000 86.00000 86.00000 86.00000 86.00000 87.00000 887.0998 94.00000 887.0998 94.00000 887.0998 94.00000 887.0998 94.00000 887.0998 94.00000 887.0998 94.00000 887.0998 94.00000 887.0998 94.00000 887.0998 94.00000 887.0998 94.00000 988.000000 988.0000000000	420.2998 321.2998 852.1999 287.0000 287.0000 347.5998
BKLG88.1992.29688.11992.29688.11992.29688.11992.29688.11992.29688.11992.29688.11992.29688.11992.2968.11992.29688.200000000000000000000000000000000000	984.8999 880.8999 707.3999 211.0000 651.0000 158.6999 158.6992
	61.1999 08.0000 00.0000 66.0000

E8	22.70000 22.70000 22.70000 22.70000 13.70000 13.70000 13.50000 14.30000 15.30000 16.39999 16.39999 17.79999 17.79999 18.00000 17.79999 18.00000 17.79999 18.00000 17.79999 18.00000 17.79999 18.00000 17.79999 18.00000 18.00000 19.00000 19.00000 19.00000 19.00000 19.00000 19.00000 19.00000 19.00000 19.00000 19.00000 19.000000 19.000000 19.0000000000
EQ8	3038.00000 1460.30990 1461.30990 1862.39990 1826.19995 826.19995 845.29980 2067.89990 2067.89990 1137.89990 1701.79980 238.29999 1701.79980 1701.79980 1701.79980 1701.79980 1701.39990 1248.09995 2313.69995 2313.699990 1641.39990 1641.39990 1641.39990 1636.00000 1641.39990 1636.00000 1641.39990 1641.39990 1642.398.89990 1643.39990 1643.39990 1644.39990 1645.39990 1646.39990 1647.39990 1647.39990 1647.39990
LEV8	0.59336 0.59336 0.59336 0.59336 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56485 0.56685 0.66485 0.6685 0.6
AL8	0.866068 0.346733 0.4366688 0.737606 0.596768 0.596768 0.5966688 0.66521 0.66521 0.66523 0.865965 0.865965 0.865965 0.865965 0.865965 0.865965 0.865965 0.865965 0.865965 0.865965 0.865965 0.866583 0.86

SALES8	20000000000000000000000000000000000000	745.3984
PVAR8		9.0000
ASST8	2593.00000 2632.00000 3836.79985 26464.00000 26464.00000 26476.09985 4621.79688 4870.29688 4870.29688 4870.29688 2319.69995 2319.69995 2115.39990 2115.39990 2115.39990 2115.39990 2116.289995 2116.289995 226995 2269995	349.7968
DEBT8	4780.00000 678.50000 678.50000 2159.89990 1841.59985 2039.50000 1798.39990 2773.00000 1798.39990 1274.500000 124.39999 761.00000 1417.00000 1617.00000 11529.50000 12581.00000 12581.69955 1615.39990 12581.69955 1605.39990 1272.00000 1272.00000 1272.00000	74.7968
BKLG8	0.00000000000000000000000000000000000	500.0000

0E8	10.4000 13.70000 13.70000 19.39999 19.39999 10.30000 11.80000 17.70000 17.70000 18.70000 18.70000 19.29999 10.10000 17.00000 18.70000 17.00000 18.70000 19.20000 10.50000 11.80000 12.70000 12.70000 12.70000 12.50000 14.20000
SHEQ8	2813.00000 1175.00000 315.39990 622.39990 622.39990 622.39990 1819.59985 507.00000 1511.79980 1067.19999 3418.79980 1558.69999 1018.79980 1057.19999 1018.79990 1019.89999 1467.69995 1467.69995 1467.69995 1691.00000 1227.29980 1227.29980
EV8	0.62954 0.56294 0.56294 0.56294 0.56294 0.56294 0.56294 0.56294 0.56294 0.56294 0.56294 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.56296 0.6620 0
SSAL8	0.82479 0.85499 0.42882 0.42882 0.63037 0.63037 0.65234 0.66234

SALES8	
00	0.00000 10.24000 98.00999 246.48999 4.41000 0.64000 0.64000 112.35999 112.35999 0.64000 0.64000 10.89000
ASST8	2110552102800008W800HW870087W1800500
DEBT81	70000000000000000000000000000000000000
	$\frac{1}{2} \sqrt{1 + \frac{1}{2}} \sqrt{1 + \frac{1}{$

R0E8	7.7999 4.7000 3.7000 7.8999 0.7000	6.3000 6.7000 11.1000 11.1000 11.1000 11.1000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000	28.29999 18.09999 10.30000 7.00000 13.30000 12.40000 12.90000 12.90000 12.90000 15.90000 15.90000 16.09999 24.20000 36.79999 11.90000
SHEQ8	55.0000 02.2998 72.0000 65.2998 22.5998	410.3999 200.0000 653.5000 653.8999 510.7999 212.5000 025.2998 159.3999	227.29999 9128.00000 2375.39990 877.79980 555.89990 1103.59985 2098.00000 1309.29980 1687.89990 1658.19995 445.29980 1417.599880 1745.00000 1743.00000 1227.00000
LEV8	.6182 .5313 .75135 .7513		0.74812 0.56413 0.60230 0.60230 0.43889 0.51368 0.51368 0.71892 0.71695 0.71695 0.53939 0.53939 0.62660 0.62660
SSAL8	. 9375 . 9375 . 4810 . 5967 . 9270		0.67399 0.76880 0.76880 0.57857 1.37288 0.98444 2.25618 0.78444 0.7844

SALES8	9426.00000 25599.89990 4383.39844 1558.59985 3294.39990 1445.00000 1658.0995 6058.09766 1658.09985 281.09985 281.09985 442.19995 3741.19995 442.19998 442.19995 442.19995 442.19995 442.19995 442.19998 452.19998 452.19998 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988 452.19988
∞	060000000000000000000000000000000000000
ASST8	066660066006606666666666666666666666666
DEBI8	3616.19995 1249.89990 1436.79980 634.89990 2097.50000 2136.79980 717.39990 2386.59985 717.39990 1625.00000 1025.00000 1042.00000 1042.00000 1042.00000 1042.00000 1042.00000 1042.00000 1042.00000 1115.69995 11174.59985 11174.59985 11174.59985 11174.59985 11174.59985
BKLG8	0.000000000000000000000000000000000000

8100	LEV8 -6097	SHEQ8 1 14.7998 45.8999	R0E8 5.8999
× 9 0 ×	. 5898 . 7045 . 6425	245.8999 999.0000 266.2998 166.7998	5000
979	.8746 .3940 .6120	306.1999 103.0998 512.5000	9.0000 0.8999 9.6000
20000	.6089 .5548 .6019	482.3999 303.5000 740.1999 130.5000	7.8999 1.0999 6.0999 4.2000
1050000	.8319 .7778 .4051 .3638	54 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	00000000000000000000000000000000000000
ってよりらりょう		302.5000 302.5000 453.0000 053.2998 874.0000	2.5000 2.5000 0.5000 1.7000 1.7000
7/13 4/13 4/13 4/13 6/13 6/13 6/13 6/13 6/13	0.45462 0.60351 0.73618 0.72955 0.43304 0.45600 0.82534 0.46502 0.68710	1250.0000 1081.19995 1862.19995 1312.59985 413.59985 2384.39990 1303.00000 1401.29980 1562.00000 1153.79980 58.70000	15.40000 16.89999 12.80000 9.20000 11.50000 24.50000 29.29999 14.70000 33.09999 15.90000

57		332,0000
PVAR7	23.03999 81.00000 68.89000 72.24998 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.35999 19.359999 19.359999 19.3599999999999999999999999999999999999	10.2479
ASST7	26897 2014.79980 2014.79980 2014.79980 2014.79980 2014.79980 2013.19995 2113.00000 3380.59985 6468.09766 6468.09766 6468.09985 130.39990 130.39990 1264.19995 1367.09985 1267.09985 2749.00000 2749.09985 2749.00000 2019.39999 2019.39999 2019.39999 2019.39999	0006.120
DEBI7	2049.6995 1178.79980 1830.00000 2022.39990 804.00000 2002.39990 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000 2570.00000000000000000000000000000000000	0006.176
BKLG7		000.000

SSAL79

SALES7	2892 2892 2892 1885 1885 1999 1885 1999 1985 1999 1965 1999 1817 1817	5448.0000 3230.5998 255.5000 6663.2968
PVAR	88100 6689999 6689999 6689999 6689999 6689999 6689999 6689999 6689999 6689999 6689999 6689999 6699999 6699999 6699999 6699999 6699999 6699999 6699999 6699999 6699999 6699999 6699999 6699999 6699999 6699999 669999 669999 669999 669999 669999 669999 6699999 669999 669999 669999 669999 669999 669999 669999 669999 669999 669999 669999 669999 669999 6699 66999 66	.7600 .6400 .8098 .4400
ASST7	1054588520670008007100800110800110	455.0000 987.8999 128.8999 293.5000
DEBT7	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	158.0000 972.0000 118.3999 854.3999
167	6915.20000 1586.39990 1686.39990 1686.89990 247.50000 247.500000 2930.00000 1858.00000 2930.00000 495.39999 495.39999 7831.00000 216.39999 660.89990 660.89990 660.89990 1256.00000 11256.00000	650.0000 884.0000 250.0000 500.0000

SALES7	4018 2292.19996 1409.89990 1409.89990 14139.69995 14
PVAR7	10.2400 2.8900 2.8900 27.0399 27.0399 37.2609 37.2609 1162.8590 37.2609 1162.8599 1162.8599 11600 22.0999 11600 24.0099 11600
ASS17	1 A A A A C A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
DEBT77	00000000000000000000000000000000000000

R0E7	14.60000 15.90000 26.59999 14.100000 23.200000 11.700000 12.59999 13.500000 14.10000 15.90000 18.59999 17.59999 10.40000 17.59999 17.59999 17.59999 18.59999 17.59999 18.59999 18.59999 19.700000 10.400000 11.600000 12.100000 12.100000 13.500000 14.900000 15.500000 16.500000 17.599999 17.599999 18.599999 19.700000 19.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.7000000 10.7000000 10.7000000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.700000 10.7000000 10.700000 1
SHEQ7	1231.29980 733.00000 733.00000 723.00000 725.59985 219.00000 725.59985 1055.79980 633.89990 643.89990 71.59999 853.59999 71.59999 71.59999 1430.29999 1430.29980 874.19995 1296.09985 925.00000 683.19995 1654.39990
EV7	0.495455 0.555455 0.654705 0.654705 0.654705 0.654705 0.654705 0.654705 0.654705 0.654705 0.654705 0.656703 0.666703 0.6
SSAL 7	0.60737 0.616456 0.616456 0.616456 0.616456 0.616456 0.616456 0.616456 0.616456 0.616456 0.616456 0.616456 0.61646 0.6

SALESZ	3918. 20222. 22222. 13923. 23924. 1393. 23954. 200000 3188. 100000 12265. 109985 4691. 10995. 2114. 200000 1597. 299990 1597. 2929. 2929. 200000 2929.
~	0/40/2/01/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2
ASST7	2017 . 29980 1919 . 509000 1457 . 199955 556 . 79980 2057 . 000000 1243 . 29980 2129 . 59980 2626 . 39990 127 . 29999 1153 . 39999 1155 . 39999 1155 . 39999 1155 . 39999 1155 . 39999 12723 . 29985 1297 . 59995 1297 . 59995 1297 . 59995 1297 . 59995 1297 . 59995 12587 . 29980 12587 . 29980 1258 . 29980 1258 . 29980 1258 . 29980
DEBT7	
BKLG7	

ROEZ	9.50000 12.00000 16.20000 16.20000 17.20000 17.20000 17.20000 17.20000 18.79999 18.79999 18.79999 18.79999 18.79999 17.20000 18.79999 17.20000 18.79999 17.20000 18.79999
SHEQ7	1084.79980 868.19995 644.00000 190.00000 190.00000 657.89990 657.89990 225.29999 1244.59985 536.19995 1244.59985 531.50000 905.79980 1244.59985 531.50000 1244.59985 1128.00000 1244.09985 1128.00000 1274.09985 1128.00000 1277.69995 814.19995 1169.29980 1169.29980 830.29980
LEVZ	0.46225 0.554769 0.55806 0.55806 0.68077 0.55811 0.558113 0.558111 0.558111 0.558111 0.5581117 0.568737 0.668737
SSAL 7	0.51481 0.92914 0.65575 0.65575 0.65575 0.65575 0.65575 0.65575 0.65575 0.65575 0.65575 0.65575 0.65575 0.65575 0.76789

LIST OF REFERENCES

- 1. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), <u>Defense</u> <u>Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR)</u>, June 1985.
- 2. Martin, Wayne Anthony, <u>An Empirical Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984</u>, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1986.
- 3. Hurdle, Gloria, J., "Leverage, Risk, Market Structure and Profitability," <u>Review of Economics and Statistics</u>, 56, November 1974.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Air Force Systems Command, "Profit Study '82 Summary Report," December 1982.
- Logistics Management Institute (LMI), <u>Defense Industry</u>
 Profit Review, (LMI TASK 69-1), March 1969.
- Morse, John, P. and Kramer, Kenyon, P., <u>DOD Contractor</u>
 <u>Profitability, 1980-1984</u>, Master's Thesis, Naval
 Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December
 1985.
- Rowe, William, D., <u>An Anatomy of Risk</u>, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1976.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

		No.	Copies
1.	Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145		2
2.	Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5002		2
3.	Professor Dan C. Boger, Code 54Bo Department of Administrative Sciences Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5000		2
4.	Professor Orrin D. Moses, Code 54Mo Department of Administrative Sciences Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5000		1
5.	LCDR David J. Louk, USN Fleet Surveillance Support Command Chesapeake, Virginia 23322-5010		3







DUDLEY REST LIBARY
NAVAL FOR A LIBORNIA 95943-8002

Thesis
L82635 Louk
c.2 A pragmatic assizement ent
of defense contractor
risk, profitability, and
debt: 1976-1984.

? FFB 89
5 MAY 89
27 AUG 92

80109
35468
21
22

Thesis L82635 Louk

c.l A pragmatic assizement of defense contractor risk, profitability, and debt: 1976-1984.

thesL82635
A pragmatic assizement of defense contra

3 2768 000 72914 9
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY